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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is an employee suffering a physical or emotional injury 
from the intentional tortious conduct of a fellow employee barred 
from suing the employer by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 of the Utah 
Worker's Compensation Act? 
REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY 
COURT OF APPEALS 
The petition for a writ of certiorari is from a May 2, 
1989, opinion issued by the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah 
in Case No. 880189-CA, Percy Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
107 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L") believes that the 
requirements of R. Utah S. Ct. 43 have not been met and, there-
fore, this Court is without jurisdiction to review the Court of 
Appeals decision. 
In particular, UP&L believes that the provisions of R. 
Utah S. Ct. 43(2) do not apply as the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals is entirely consistent with and based upon the decisions 
of this Court. 
The proceedings before the Third District Court and the 
Court of Appeals were squarely within the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings. The Appellant has not cited any 
instances of departure from this usual course. Therefore, R. 
Utah S. Ct. 43(3) does not apply and the exercise of this Court's 
power of supervision is not required. 
Finally, UP&L believes that as the Court of Appeals 
opinion is based upon well settled law established by this Court, 
and R. Utah S. Ct. 43(4) does not provide jurisdiction. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The provision of Utah law, as defined and interpreted 
by this Court, which is controlling is U.C.A. § 35-1-60 (1988), 
which states: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries sus-
tained by an employee, whether resulting in death 
or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the 
employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against 
any officer, agent or employee of the employer and 
the liabilities of the employer imposed by this 
act shall be in place of any and air other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law . r otherwise, 
to such employee or to his spouse, widow, chil-
dren, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other 
person whomsoever, on account of any accident or 
injury or death in any way contracted, sustained, 
aggravated or incurred by such employee in the 
course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent 
or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in 
this section, however, shall prevent an employee 
(or his dependents) from filing a claim with the 
industrial commission of Utah for compensation in 
those cases within the provisions of the Utah 
Occupational Disease Diability Act, as amended. 
[Emphasis added] 
-?-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Percy Mounteer ("Mounteer"), a UP&L employee, claimed 
that due to the intentional tortious act of a fellow UP&L em-
ployee, a pre-existing employment injury was aggravated and 
further, he was emotionally injured which required hospitaliza-
tion. Complaint M 9, 10, 11, and 12, Record pp. 4 and 5 (R. 
) . Mounteer sustained the new injuries during the course of 
his employment. The origins of his pre-existing medical problems 
are also found in his employment. Complaint ff 4, 5, 6, and 7; 
R. 3 and 4. The injuries resulting from the intentional tortious 
act required medical treatment and permanently and totally 
disabled Mounteer from employment. Complaint 5 18; R. 5. 
Mounteer only claims that UP&L is vicariously liable 
for his medical expenses, lost and future wages, and general 
damages. Mounteer does not claim that UP&L consciously or 
deliberately intended injury to him or directed that any other 
employee injure him. 
Based upon Mounteer1s allegations, the complaint was 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. R. 107 and 125. 
ARGUMENT 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, affirming the 
lower court's dismissal of the action, is supportable on two 
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independent grounds, both of which have been articulated by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
First, Mounteer failed to allege, and indeed could not 
in good faith allege, that UP&L intended injury to Mounteer or 
that UP&L directed another employee to intentionally injure him. 
Either of these two set of facts is a condition precedent to any 
claim by an employee against the employer for injuries suffered 
while on the job from the intentional acts of a fellow employee. 
Bryan v. Utah Intern!1., 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). Accord, Lantz 
v. Nat'l. Semiconductor Corp., 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Ct. of App. 
1989) and cases cited therein. 
The Court of Appeals noted that Mounteer failed to meet 
this condition and therefore, as a matter of law UP&L is not 
liable by operation of vicarious liability. 
If Mounteer had alleged facts supporting an 
inference that UP&L directed or intended Larsen's 
injurious actions, he would have sufficiently 
stated a claim against UP&L directly and the 
statute would likewise afford UP&L no shield from 
liability and damages. "A complaint, to survive a 
motion to dismiss, must do more than merely allege 
intentional injury as an exception to the general 
exclusiveness rule; it must allege facts that add 
up to a deliberate intent [by the employer] to 
bring about injury. 2A A. Larson, Workmens 
Compensation Law § 68:14 (1987)." Mounteer v. 
Utah Power, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. at 73. 
As Mounteer did not allege those facts, his complaint 
was fatally defective. This defect alone is sufficient reason to 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of the action based as it is 
on long established and unquestioned Utah law. 
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The second prong to UP&L's defense was that Mounteer's 
complaint sought compensation for injuries which Mounteer alleged 
were contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred during the 
course and scope of his employment with UP&L. The Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act, UP&L argued, is the exclusive remedy for the 
medical expenses, wage loss and physical and mental impairment 
which Mounteer suffered. 
Mounteer relates his present permanent physical and emo-
tional disabilities to his employment with UP&L, or its prede-
cessor, commencing in December 1984. Mounteer claims that he 
carried those injuries with him throughout his employment when, 
in October 1986, they came to the surface because of an on-the-
job incident resulting in hospitalization and physical and 
emotional disability. The injuries Mounteer claims all arose 
from the performance of his duties as a UP&L employee, the 
ultimate consequence of which was to permanentaly and totally 
preclude him from working for UP&L. There are no injuries which 
more clearly fall within the definition in U.C.A. § 35-1-60 of 
those injuries for which worker's compensation is the exclusive 
remedy. Importantly, the allegations and description of the 
injuries which mandate the application of the exclusivity statute 
come verbatum from Mounteer's pleadings. 
The numerous citations by the Court of Appeals to the 
well established precedent of this Court is, UP&L believes, 
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sufficient response to Mounteerfs argument that the Utah Supreme 
Court has either decided cases differently than the Court of 
Appeals or has not addressed the issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts that form the foundation upon which the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals based their decisions are facts 
which Mounteer alleged in his complaint. These facts lead to the 
same conclusion; the complaint failed to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted for two independent legal reasons. 
First, Mounteer has failed to plead and cannot in good 
faith plead an absolute conditional element to his claim. 
Second, the very injuries which Mounteer describes are those 
injuries for which he was provided the benefit of worker's 
compensation in exchange for which he is barred from suing the 
employer. 
Each of these grounds upon which the Court of Appeals 
based its decision, independent of one another, are well founded 
in this Court's opinions. The petition for Writ of Certiorari 
should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jjj day of June 1989. 
UTAHPOWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
Paul H. Proctor, Attorney for 
Utah Power & Light Company 
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